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THE FAITH OF AN ATHEIST
BY ROBERT P. RICHARDSON
IT is an old adage that half the world does not know how the
other half lives. Equally true would it be to say that half the
intellectual world does not know how the other half thinks. An
illustration of this is afforded by an article. The Unbelief of an
Unbeliever, in The Open Court of November, 1927. The author,
T. B. Stork, though doubtless endeavoring to be fair, shows himself
quite unable to understand a point of view, that of Atheism,
diametrically opposed to his own. This is perhaps not surprising,
since the title "Atheist" is most frequently made use of either as
a term of reproach or as a gesture of defiance. Those who use it
in the latter way, upholding Atheism merely in the spirit of bravado,
are hardly competent to give adequate account of that philosophical
position, and it may be of service to set forth this as it appears to
one who considers the matter dispassionately and adopts the name
"Atheist" merely as a descriptive title.
To accept Atheism is, of course, to take the view that there is
no God, and this is definite denial, not the "doubt" which some of our
opponents attribute to us. Those who so misapprehend us will
hardly contend that every assertion not believed is to be "doubted"
unless it is a direct contradiction in terms, and yet it is only in such
a sense that an Atheist can be said to "doubt" any theistic affirma-
tion. There is no logical contradiction in saying that the earth is
flat, but who has any doubts as to the falsity of that assertion?
Likewise there is no local contradiction in saying there exists a
being corresponding to certain conceptions of God. but the Atheist
finds the evidence of this on a par with reasons for affirming the
flatness of the earth.
The theistic conceptions which are most satisfactory as regards
self-consistency are however precisely those which appeal the least
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to the ordinary Theist. Such is the conception of a personal God
of strictly limited powers and perhaps limited knowledge. It is
these limitations alone which make it possible to regard Him as
"good" in the sense in which this adjective is used by any decent
man or woman. Of this character was the God of John Stuart
]\Iill (in whose opinion however the "appearances in. nature" while
indicating a Creator, "absolutely contradicts the idea of a perfectly
good maker") and the "Invisible King" plays a like part in the
Theism of H. G. Wells who regards him as a strongly marked and
knowable personality, loving, inspiring and lovable. The Atheist,
while he cannot agree with them, has the greatest respect and
sympathy for those whose faith is in a Prince of the Power of
Goodness, a supernatural leader of mankind in the struggle for
right. But as man makes God in his own image, those who hold
this belief are not numerous, the common herd preferring a more
ignoble object of adoration and usually describing their Deity as
all-wise and all-powerful. True, it is probable that many believers
of this type ascribe omnipotence and omniscence to their God only
in a Pickwickian sense. This is the traditional attitude carried do'wn
from savages who fawned upon and flattered a superhuman being
whom they feared. Their characterization of Him as all-powerful
and all-knowing meant no more than the stock phrases of adulation
addressed to a petty Oriental despot by his subjects. Taking how-
ever the customary phraseology at its face value, the Atheist mvtst
file a decisive caveat in the name of both logic and morality against
the orthodox conception of God. Omnipotence, if it means anything
at all, means the ability to do whatever does not involve a contra-
diction. An omnipotent God could not make a three-sided
quadrilateral. Nor could He, while leaving mankind freedom of
the will, prevent a human being from deciding to kill another. But
he could make a world in which the shortest path between two points
was not along a Euclidean straight line but along a Lobatchevskian
geodesic, and in which two parallel lines, instead of being every-
where equidistant were asymptotic. And unquestionably he could
always paralyse the arm of the would-be murderer and prevent the
accomplishment of the crime. This means that an omnipotent God,
if he exist, must be held responsible for all the evils of the universe.
All misery, all crime, everything that is base and vile, exists because
he suffers it. To accept such a Deity has as logical consequence the
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destruction of all morality— it means taking- His pleasure, evinced
by nature "red in tO(Jth and claw", as the standard of right and
wrong, and sa)ing that whatever is is right. And the Atheist not
only rejects the evidence brought forward for the existence of the
orthodox personal God, but fails to hnd an\thing worth)' of respect
in this conception.
As time goes on conceptions of personal Gods find less favor with
the Theists of the intellectual type. These believers of to-day usually
pin their faith upon a God who is decidedly lacking in personality,
not to say individuality. None the less Theists indulge in the
misnomer of designating this God by the masculine pronoun "He."
Their "He" is however wrapped in mystery, and Mr. Wells not
unaptly describes Him as "The Veiled Being" comprising the
"ultimate mysteries of the universe." This being whom we are
called upon to worship is, we are given to understand, the Supreme
Ruler of the Universe, a ^Mighty Incomprehensible Power, the First
Cause of all that happens and of all that exists, the Essence or
Ultimate Ground of all things, etc. etc. It is in reference to such
phrases that it is sometimes said that the Atheist does not deny the
existence of God but merely declares he does not know what Theists
mean when they speak of Him. [Misunderstanding is however prone
to arise from this way of putting the matter, and it would be more
to the point to say that the Atheist feels he knows only too well
what the phrases in question mean and that in most cases they mean
nothing; they are nonsense. It is indeed precisely this stand which
distinguishes the true Atheist from the Agnostic. For the latter,
with Herbert Spencer, whose philosophy has been well said to have
a "recognizable Theistic tendency" listens in reverence and awe to
the stock phrases of Impersonal Theism and proceeds to invent one
of his own, "The Unknowable"", before which he prostrates himself.
The controversy here, of course, is one of philosophy, and
Atheism, in the proper sense of that term, being a philosophical
doctrine is the natural product of a certain school of philosophical
thought. \\'hether one turns to the side of Theism and its ally
Agnosticism or to that of Atheism depends in the last analysis on
the philosophy he adopts. And the philosophy of Empiricism or
Phenomenalism (as opposed to Institutionalism and Realism or
Noumenalism)—the philosophical spirit which distinguished Aris-
totle from Plato, and Occam from Duns Scotus and Aquinas, and
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which in modern times inspired such thinkers as Hobbes, Locke,
Berkeley, Hume and Mill—this is unquestionably the high road to
Atheism. Those who have steadfastly kept on this road will not
admit an Unknowable but will concede only the possibility of many
unknowns—things unknown, that is to say, to us. For in the
Empirical philosophy existence and perceptibility go hand in hand,
and what could not be perceived by some sentient being, properly
located, is ipse facto non-existent. Perceivability is, of course,
sometimes hypothetical, that is we say something exists although
not actually perceived because we are convinced it would be per-
ceived were it accessible to observation. And moreover due account
is taken of the possibility of something being perceived by more
gifted percipients where human beings perceive nothing. Thus
there need be no hesitation in admitting as possible the existence of
things we cannot perceive, a possibility which would pass into a
probability were we to meet with a race of persons who, claiming
ability to perceive where we do not^ showed themselves to be superior
to normal human beings in the way the latter are superior to the
blind.
Positing such contingencies the Atheist contends that while there
may be unknowns which are unknowable to him there can assuredly
be no absolute Unknowable. To assert existence where there is
no possibility of perceiving anything is nonsense. And to take as
object of worship the unknowable as such, appears to the Atheist the
height of folly. A shadow is unknown and unknowable to a blind
man but who would say he ought to accept it as his God ?
Like the shibboleth of Agnosticism the banal phrases of
Impersonal Theism fail to survive the scrutiny of the Empirical
Philosophy. A "supreme ruler" either denotes a person or is a
phrase devoid of sense. The "cause" of the ancient philosophy
vanished into thin air under the keen scrutiny of Hume, leaving
causation nothing more than an observed reoccurrence of events
of one type when events of another type reoccur. This empirical
relation has no necessity about it, and the alleged need for a first
cause is thrown out of court at once. There is no justification
whatever for assuming that everything must have a cause, still less
for asserting that every event is a link in a chain of causation which
when traced back far enough must have, as a link common to every
other chain, a first and uncaused cause. Causes moreover being
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merely commonplace events, the fact that a certain event was the
first in the universe would not justify setting it up as an object of
adoration. It is not impossible that billions of years ago the universe
came to a beginning through the springing into existence of material
bodies—that is, matter and space and w^ith them time. But this
event would have no more claim to be worshipped than a fall of
meteors to the earth. Such an event is not a prime mover of the
universe, nor would its priority to all other events justify assuming
there to have been a prime mover behind it. Similarly such words
as "Ground," "Power," "Mysteries" etc. fail to move the Empirical
philosopher to thoughts of things divine. They are intelligible when
properly used, but in theistic parlance seem merely to serve as inter-
jections expressive of emotions of awe and bewilderment arising
from considering the universe as a whole. If an interpretation
beyond this is attempted the words are found to denote something
one knows not what, located no one knows where. And what is
merely something but is nothing in particular—which lacks aliquid-
dity, to use an old scholastic phraseology which might well be
revived—is outside the pale of thought, still more of belief.
To the Atheist then the "intellectual compulsion" to faith in an
incomprehensible God is nil. Nor does he find any emotional urgings
towards such belief. He cannot find in a psuedo-conception which
under philosophical analysis is resolved into a meaningless phrase
the comfort which history tells us a certain old lady took in "the
blessed word Mesopotamia." As to the orthodox personal God, an
all-powerful Being who has under full control all the suffering and
evil in the world but will not lift a finger to right human wrongs, the
thought, if taken seriously, would be a veritable nightmare. The
Invisible King theory, that of God, Limited, is, on the other hand,
in the view of the Atheist, a pleasant dream. But enjoyable as a
dream may be, when taken as such, there is grave danger in attempt-
ing to put dream life on a par with real life. Cravings for a dream-
world existence full of glorious illusions can be satisfied by hashish
even more efficaciously then by illogic, but he who addicts himself
to either is ill-advised.
To the Theist, apparently, the greatest consolation of religion is
the promise of a life hereafter, and this again makes no appeal to
the Atheist. Passing in review all the heavens promised to true
believers by the various faiths the Atheist finds none of them to his
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taste. As he mentally inspects each he is constrained to murmur
:
This is no place for a gentleman ! Quite manifest is the lack of attrac-
tion in the orthodox heaven where eternity is spent in giving praise
to a superhuman being who is actually supposed to enjoy this
incessant adulation. As to survival in the Buddhist Nirvana where
all desire and indeed all activity, mental and physical ceases, this
would simply be life from which has been taken all that makes
life worth while. \Mio would desire future existence as a jelly
fish? The Spiritualist "Summerland" is the worst of all, for here,
according to reports that reach us, you sink to the level of an
imbecile. Shakespeare composes doggerel unworthy of a schoolboy,
and Aristotle, giving tip the search for truth which was his dearest
interest in life babbles inanities about the happiness of the dwellers
in Summerland and tells old women where they can find lost
thimbles. And considering the possibilities of life beyond the grave
in all its aspects the Atheist is inclined to echo the sentiments of that
great philosopher, John Stuart Mill, who said: "The belief in life
after death without any probable surmise as to what it is to be
would be no consolation but the very king of terrors. A journey
into the utterly unknown—the thought is sufficient to strike with
alarm the firmest heart. . . . It is well, therefore, that all appear-
ances and probabilities are in favor of the cessation of our conscious-
ness when our earthly mechanism ceases to work.^
Theists, looking at Atheism from the outside, have a curious
habit of assuming that in this philosophy of life there is no room for
morality. The contention is that ethics requires some superhuman
sanction, and that without this human beings, abandoned to their
own inclination, will let selfishness run riot, each individual taking
as sole motive of action the attainment of pleasure for him or herself.
And hence virtue, declares the Theist, is dependent on belief in
God and cannot exist without it. Thus speaks the Theist, and those
who care more for catchwords than for logical conclusions may
accept his ipse dixit. Those however who rank logic above rhetoric
will prefer first of all to examine the facts. And the truth is that
with man and all the animals above a certain low level, attainment
of selfish pleasure is not what is paramount in moving the individual
to action. What really reigns supreme in nature is care for the
1 See Letters of John Stuart Mill, edited by Hugh Elliott, London, 1910,
V. II, p. 380.
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welfare of the offspring. And self-sacrifice to that end, not sterile
self-gratification, is the law of life. This fact stares us in the face,
manifest to all not blinded by their pre-conceptions. Altruism then,
which we find can and does extend beyond one's own family and
even beyond the human race, is a fact, and the morality based on
this fact has and needs no other sanction than that of the human
conscience—individual and collective. Indeed to seek other sanctions
for virtue is to destroy it at its very roots. As Archbishop W'hately
said : "Honesty is the best policy, but he who acts upon that principle
is not an honest man." Atheists admit they cannot force a man to
be virtuous by promises of heaven or threats of hell. If a man tells
us he is a complete egotist having his own pleasure as his sole aim
in life, we have no way of convincing him that he ought to feel
otherwise. But we do know for a certainty that under natural
conditions—conditions which, alas, have been much denatured
through religious influence—the men who live for themselves alone
will be gradually weeded out of the racial stock. We know also
that branches of the race in which each man cares solely for the
welfare of himself and his own progeny will not survive in the
struggle for existence. A tribe cannot survive in intertribal com-
petition unless it is imbued with a certain amount of the spirit of
solidarity by which an individual is willing in case of necessity
to sacrifice himself for the sake of the community.
The Atheist, then, is far more sanguine than the Theist as regards
the possibilities of purely human virtue. And believing it to be
of the utmost importance that the development of these possibilities
be helped instead of being hindered, he feels that the world has need
of Atheism. It has need, that is, of looking facts in the face and
not being misled by sonorous phrases and maudlin sentimentality.
It must resolve that the meet and not the meek shall inherit the earth.
If there is to be progress, moral, intellectual or ph}sical, in the
human race, it must forget the Sermon on the ]\Iount and contempt-
uously reject the Socialistic demand for "equality of opportunity."
Preferential treatment and preferential reproduction of the most
fit must be the corner stone of the social edifice. We must not put
forward as an ideal the much vaunted Golden rule which, as has
been well said, would wreck any race that seriously tried to apply
it. ^^'e may not spare the life of a murderer or of a man-eating
tiger merely because if we were in his predicament we would desire
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to be spared. The community must disregard the customary cant
about "the sanctity of life" and "lack of moral responsibility" in
dealing with a criminal, that is with a man or woman in whom
egotism prevails over innate virtue to the extent of producing an
aggression upon a fellow citizen. Human weeds must be destroyed
that fair flowers may bloom in the garden of life.
On the other hand we must guard against degenerating into
a race which can live only in a moral or physical nursery. And
hence we must bear in mind that, as Mr. Wiggam remarks (in The
New Decalogue of Science) "vice purifies a race because it kills its
victims. It thus leaves the strong, the robust and virtuous to hand
the torch of heredity to the man unborn." We must not be too
anxious to shield a fool from the consequences of his folly. The
state must not endeavor to "suppress vice" or to enforce prohibitory
laws designed to deter a man from doing something that harms him
alone. It must raise its revenue, as far as possible, not by taxing
the earnings of the industrious but by licensing at a high tariff the
vices of their degenerate fellow citizens. On the positive side we
must cultivate pleasure, not eschew it, and must regard as a gain
to humanity every enjoyment not injurious or degrading. We must
endeavor to practice and to preach all the manly virtues without
forgetting to cherish those more particularly feminine. Priestly
virtues indeed we must disdain : a rational philosophy of life has
no place for meekness, asceticism, alienation from the world, the
flesh and the bath tub. But whatever is good and wholesome we
shall applaud : integrity, sincerity, fidelity to one's engagements,
kindness (towards the lower animals as well as .toward our own
kind), chivalry toward the weak, courage (though not the foolhardi-
ness so much in favor which risks life for no worthy end) , industry,
initiative, self-reliance, staunch defence of one's rights coupled with
respect for those of others, love of the good and hatred of evil (the
former being impossible without the latter)—all these in the com-
munity of the future will be honored by every organ of public
opinion. Press and pulpit will have as their aim the focusing
of attention upon vital truths and noble deeds, and will no longer
be devoted to making heroes of buffoons and criminals and to
expounding the platitudes of impossible sociological and religious
creeds. Thus and thus only can man make his Utopia a reality.
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And with this perspective—a theory of hfe and progress more
hopeful, more inspiring and more beautiful than anything Theism
has to offer—the Atheist may say with the poet
:
"And by that light, now, mark my word, we'll build the I'erfect Ship.
I'll never last to judge her lines or take her curve not I,
But I have lived and I have worked"—no thanks to aught on high.
